Prevention of Unplanned Explosions at Munitions Sites in Tajikistan by Harutyunyan, Artyom & Mamadnazarova, Ramzia
Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction 
Volume 17 
Issue 2 The Journal of ERW and Mine Action Article 5 
July 2013 
Prevention of Unplanned Explosions at Munitions Sites in 
Tajikistan 
Artyom Harutyunyan 
Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) 
Ramzia Mamadnazarova 
Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal 
 Part of the Other Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration Commons, and the Peace and 
Conflict Studies Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Harutyunyan, Artyom and Mamadnazarova, Ramzia (2013) "Prevention of Unplanned Explosions at 
Munitions Sites in Tajikistan," The Journal of ERW and Mine Action : Vol. 17 : Iss. 2 , Article 5. 
Available at: https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol17/iss2/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Center for International Stabilization and Recovery at 
JMU Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction by an 
authorized editor of JMU Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact dc_admin@jmu.edu. 
6         focus | the journal of ERW and mine action | spring 2013 | 17.1
Prevention of Unplanned Explosions 
 at Munitions Sites in Tajikistan
by Artyom Harutyunyan and Ramzia Mamadnazarova [ Swiss Foundation for Mine Action, Tajikistan ]
Poorly stored stockpiles of aging munitions continue to pose threats in Tajikistan. Since 2009, the 
Fondation Suisse de Déminage (the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action or FSD) has worked with 
Tajikistan’s Ministries of Defense and Interior and its border guards to dispose of surplus weapons 
and munitions. These efforts were funded by the government of the Netherlands and the Office of 
Weapons Removal and Abatement in the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Political-Military Af-
fairs (PM/WRA).
With the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, former Soviet republics inherited vast amounts of Soviet weaponry from military 
units previously stationed in these now independent repub-
lics. Three of these countries, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and 
Tajikistan, served as staging points for Soviet forces during 
the invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s and produced and 
maintained considerable stocks of Soviet weapons and muni-
tions. When Tajikistan entered into civil war in 1992, these 
former Soviet armories (still occupied by idle Soviet units) 
served as a major source of small arms for both government 
and opposition forces. Other sources of small arms came from 
high-ranking local law enforcement officers who appropriated 
the weapons available to them, as well as from Afghanistan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Uzbekistan.1      
When the war ended in 1997, thousands of tons of muni-
tions were left unguarded in makeshift storage sites, many of 
which were forgotten. Today, the munitions stored in these 
abandoned caches continue to decay, increasing the like-
lihood of unplanned explosions. Moreover, these caches, 
some of which include weapons such as mortars, heavy ma-
chine guns, rocket-propelled grenade launchers and shoul-
der-launched surface-to-air missiles, have reportedly been 
targeted by criminals and militant extremists and pose a seri-
ous security threat to the Tajikistani people.2         
Although demilitarization programs operated across the 
country during and after the civil war, recent clashes in Ta-
vildara (2009), Gharm (2010) and Khorugh (2012) with armed 
groups show that citizens continue to possess a considerable 
amount of small arms and light weapons (SA/LW).3,4,5  
Small arms ammunition being destroyed in an incinerator.
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Unplanned Explosions
A survey conducted by the Small Arms Survey indicates a 
more than two-fold increase in unplanned explosions at mu-
nitions sites globally since 1987, with 69 events from 1987–
1996 and 194 events from 1997–2006.6 Although there are no 
official statistics available, there was at least one unplanned 
explosion in Tajikistan in 2009 caused by handling errors and 
poor working practices.7  
While unplanned explosions tend to originate from me-
chanical and chemical deterioration of ammunition brought 
on by poorly met standards within storage depots, additional 
risk factors exist: 
•	 Storage area defects such as electrical short circuits
•	 Negligent behavior including dropping ammunition or 
smoking in the facility 
•	 Environmental dangers such as extreme temperature 
shifts, lightning or fires 
In Tajikistan, summer temperatures can reach upward of 
50 degrees Celsius (122 degrees Fahrenheit), and the dry cli-
mate increases the likelihood for fires.2
Reducing the number of unplanned munitions explosions 
may require additional training for staff working at stor-
age sites. Likewise, constructing new storage facilities and 
renovating existing structures will eliminate external and 
environmental threats. Problems related to deteriorating mu-
nitions can only be solved by separating them from stable mu-
nitions and disposing of the unstable munitions.
Weapons and Ammunitions Disposal
In 2003, the Fondation Suisse de Déminage (the Swiss 
Foundation for Mine Action or FSD) signed a memorandum 
of agreement, which the Majlisi Oli (Tajikistan’s Supreme As-
sembly) ratified on 20 June 2003. Tajikistan’s inability to prop-
erly secure and maintain its munitions sites alerted FSD of the 
need for a Weapons and Ammunitions Disposal (WAD) team 
in Tajikistan. In April 2009, FSD and Tajikistan’s First Deputy 
Minister of Defense, Lt. Gen. Ramil Nadirov, met and initiat-
ed the WAD project. 
Besides conducting munitions disposal, FSD’s other activi-
ties in the region include landmine and explosive remnants 
of war survey, clearance and land release. FSD’s WAD proj-
ect is the only Tajik program actively operating in weapons, 
small-arms and ammunition disposal and is supported by 
Tajikistan’s border guards, Ministry of Defense (MOD) and 
Ministry of Interior (MOI). Its objectives are as follows:
•	 To train and provide necessary equipment for teams 
consisting of FSD and MOD staff for the destruction of 
unserviceable, outdated and redundant conventional 
ammunition
•	 To facilitate SA/LW, large-caliber ammunition, aircraft 
Cluster munitions for destruction.
Photo courtesy of Magali Koenig/FSD.
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bombs and man-portable air-defense systems (MAN-
PADS) destruction
•	 To improve munitions-stockpile security and manage-
ment through relevant staff trainings8
The government of the Netherlands funded the first team 
to conduct WAD operations starting in May 2009 and has con-
tinuously assisted the WAD team for nearly three and a half 
years. Over this period, the Netherlands contributed more 
than EU€1,000,000 (US$1,277,300 as of 4 April 2013) to FSD. 
In 2011 and 2012, the Office of Weapons Removal and 
Abatement in the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Po-
litical-Military Affairs (PM/WRA) provided Tajikistan with 
more than US$2.5 million to support WAD teams and mine 
action in Tajikistan.9,10 The total PM/WRA contribution for 
Tajikistan in 2011 was US$1 million, and the 2012 total was 
$1,691,120. Through fiscal year 2012, the U.S. invested more 
than $6.8 million in conventional weapons-destruction 
(CWD) programs in Tajikistan.9
Program Results
From 1 May 2009 to 31 December 2012, WAD project 
teams achieved the following results:
•	 154,952 rounds of ammunition of 20-mm caliber and 
higher were destroyed by using a high explosive attack 
method. 
•	 1,025,155 small arms ammunition from 5.45-mm to 
14.5-mm caliber were destroyed in incinerators de-
signed locally by FSD’s technical staff in Tajikistan. 
•	 7,180 light weapons and their components were de-
stroyed with high pressure hydraulic shears.11
During a 2012 examination of depots throughout the 
country, Tajikistan’s MOD officers and WAD staff also found 
645 anti-personnel mines, which later were destroyed at FSD’s 
central demolition site near Dushanbe. Other notable muni-
tions were found as well: 
•	 116 anti-tank mines from depots 
•	 400 cluster munitions 
•	 40 MANPADS  
Two refresher courses and three courses in ammunition 
safe-handling and explosive-ordnance disposal (EOD) at each 
of the three International Mine Action Standards levels were 
carried out from 2009–2013. Additionally in 2012, two SA/LW 
Cutting Standard Operation Procedures courses were given 
to MOI and border guard officers. Altogether, 82 civilians, 
Demolition pit with MANPADS, mortar shells and artillery shells.
Photo courtesy of Artyom Harutyunyan/FSD.
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25 officers from the MOD Engineering 
Department, eight officers from MOI 
and five border guard officers attended 
courses and were successfully accredited 
as EOD operators. 
Physical security and stockpile man-
agement (PSSM) issues continue to pres-
ent serious security concerns to Tajiki-
stan, and FSD strives to support the 
government in resolving these issues. 
Additionally, the government of Tajiki-
stan continues to take steps to improve 
stockpile security. On 3 January 2013, 
deputies of Majlisi Namoyandagon (Ta-
jikistan’s lower house of parliament) 
ratified a PSSM agreement between Ta-
jikistan and NATO.12 FSD hopes the 
MOD, together with the MOI, will take 
ownership and manage the PSSM proj-
ect in the near future; however, no con-
crete steps to transfer control of the proj-
ect have been taken at this time. 
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